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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
May 2, 1973 
Re: No. 72-493 - Vlandis v. Kline 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
j.tJ.t. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
May 3, 1973 
Re: No. 72-493 - Vlandis v. Kline 
Dear Potter: 
I anticipate preparing and circulating a dissent from 
your opinion in this case. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 






JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
•· 
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May 14, 1973 
Re: No. 72-493, Vlandis v. Kline 
Dear Bill, 
My Conference notes in this case indicate that 
the strong view of a majority in our Conference discussion 
was that this case should not be decided on the basis of the 
right to travel; but rather, as I have suggested in my pro-
posed opinion, on the type of analysis used in Carrington, 
which, of course, is not a right-to-travel case. One of the 
biggest obstacles to basing this case on the right to travel 
is, as you know, our summary affirmance in Starns v. 
Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985, upholding the validity of a one-
year durational residency requirement to qualify for in-
state tuition at the University of Minnesota. 
I would appreciate it, however, if you would 
circulate your letter to me and this reply to the Conference, 
so as to obtain the views of the Brethren on this matter 
at their early convenience. If a majority indicate that they 
would prefer your analysis, based on the right to travel, 
I would be glad to attempt a restructuring of my opinion 




Mr. Justice Brennan 
("'' 
CHAMBE R S OF 
.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN . .JR. 
, . 
.iu:vrttttt <!}curt ttf tqt 1J:lttiteh .itattg 
P'aGltittgtcn. ~. <!}. 2!1~,~~ 
May 14, 1973 
RE: No. 72-493 Vlandis v. Kline 
Dear Potter: 
'""'!o 
Thurgood asked me to write this for both of us. We owe you 
an apology. Both of us had told you that we might be able to join the 
approach taken in your opinion rather than basing the result on the 
right to travel as in Shapiro and Dunn v. Blumstein. We've come to 
the conclusion that we were wrong. 
We have no doubt that States may confine to their residents 
the payment of welfare benefits, the right to vote and attendance at 
state colleges and universities. But the Connecticut statute. goes 
beyond this in discriminating among actual bona fide residents for 
tuition purposes. Insofar as the distinction is predicated on common 
experience that few out-of-state students actually acquire a residence, 
we think it would be impossible to strike down the classification under 
the mere rationality test, particularly in light of the readiness of the 
Court to assume any reasonable state of facts that might justify it. 
We therefore think that if the strict scrutiny test is the proper one, 
and we think it is, it is essential to recognize that in discriminating 
among bona fide residents for purposes of tuition in the state univer-
sity system, the statute impinges upon the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to travel in order to change one's state of residence. For 
Connecticut has provided that a conclusive and irrebutable presumption 
of non-residency shall arise for tuition purposes from the fact that a 
student, if married, was legally residing outside of the State at the 
time he applied for admission to the state university, or, if single, 
was legally residing outside of the state at any time during the year 





establish durational residency requirements for the receipt of public 
welfare, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), or for the 
exercise of the state franchise, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 
(1972), the Connecticut residency statute singles out a "class of bona 
fide .•• state residents who have recently exercised [their] constitu-
tionally protected right" to travel -- a right that "includes the 'freedom 
to enter and abide in any State in the Union"' -- "and penalize[ s] such 
travel directly," id., at 338. It may be that Connecticut's residency 
statute for tuition purposes does not actually deter exercise of the right 
to travel. But as we pointed out in Dunn, supra, at 339-340, a deter-
mination that the challenged statute is actually deterring travel is 
"irrelevant"; rather, to call for strict scrutiny of the residency law it 
is enough that the state has conditioned exercise by certain persons 
of their right to travel and ultimately to change their residence upon 
surrender of in-state tuition benefits, thereby penalizing otherwise 
bona fide residents for the exercise of this constitutional right. 
Under these circumstances, the Connecticut residency law can 
be sustained only if the State is able to demonstrate that it is "necessary 
to promote a compelling governmental interest. " Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S., at 634. See also id., at 643-644. 
But the State's concern for certainty in limiting the benefits of 
a state subsidized education to bona fide residents cannot justify the 
permanent, unassailable presumption of nonresidency that attaches 
for tuition purposes to certain otherwise bona fide residents because 
of their recent interstate travel. Where, as here, "there are other, 
reasonable ways to achieve [that goal] with a lesser burden on con-
stitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of 
greater interference." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S., at 3 53. 
Are you disposed to restructure your opinion or would you 
prefer that we file our own concurrence along these lines? Again, 
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.iu.p-rcmc C!fll"lttt cf t~e 2Jlnitc2t ~tme~ 
'JID'aslrin.gtcn, ~. <!J. 2Ll,?J.!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR. May 14, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
No. 72-493 Vlandis v. Kline 
I circulate herewith self-explanatory 
correspondence between Potter and me in 
the above case. 
W.J. B. Jr. 
'f-.:· 
v, 
I had thought, as you did, that there ria no senttm'ent at the 
Conference for deeidlng this ease em a "right to travel" bastS!,, But "'' 
all ba.Ye a right to change our minds - as-I frequently do - and so I 
address the substance of the positicm now favored by BW and, Thurgood.: 
.,, , .. :·.:~~~;;~ -~ 
mi.1J &. . ~~$· 
r ·eould not accept the view that the "compeWng governmental 
interest" standard 1s applleable. As has been ncted by you and others, 
oa.ee we hold that this 1s the appropriate standard no state has ever been 
able to meet it. This w<*ld result, inevitably I think, in the states being 
unable to prctect their educational lnstltutioas from a seriou.s tntruion 
of ncmresidents purporting to exercise their unquestioned right to travel.' 
.. .. 
•I fi·-q 
l ·, ~ 
There is little parallel between state actlcm prctectlng educational 
institutions and state action imposing limitations on the right to vcte and 
upoo receipt of welfare payments. Voting rights and welfare payments 
involye no qualitatlYe factor, whereas colleges and universities vary 
widely in quality, history and goals. They also vary in the diversity' 
of their curricula, strength of faculty, and scope of degrees offered. 
Their appeal to the young also may depend upon attractiveness of location, 
-~·current fashion as to "in-schools", and even the quality and extent of . 
[;• ~~ ' ·' ·,' ' >• ,.,,;: .. ' !>; 
~- pbysleal facUlties. , ·. · · ... ~.tl'·w • 0 •·• .hr.:.·"'·-: -·~/'; 
-~~ -' 1,!11 ~~u~~::~., 1 -'- -~ 
'"" -"'</!,f' f~--~1' 1·'i-) ., -,, "' ···1r ·• •!<i'~'""-,---TI'"·,-,,.,~- ~w···c• '!lij 
If, in the exercise of the right to travel;' yo1mg people were ' 
allowed - in effect - to attend tuition free (or with reduced tuition) th 





they have become domiclltartes of the state, some, of our ~finest state til 
universities c auld b8 overwhelmed with applicattoos. Most of these 
already are overcrowded, and have some gaidel~es as to the number 
of nc:mresidents accepted. If a state is denied the right to impose 
reasonable limitations on the influx of out-of-state students who 
immediately claim (often quite honestly) to be bona fide residents, 
injustice -as well as a certain amount of fraucf"iiil result. Lower 
standarda of admtsslc:m are eustomarUy provided for the cbUdren of~ 
boDa tide residents, Including many from underprtvtleged famWes who 
simply could not' afford to lea\'8 their homes to'seek an education In 
• oth -"-·t "' ~·,,~,•~. ' >Wd< ,~ an er ~:~-..e. ~ ·~·· · 
'\~ 
nte· question 'of domtcUe is largelf~, matter Ot,fone's intent, 
a highly subjective factor. The objective indications of intent (registering 
to vote, changing license tags, and paying state ~axes) are all relatively 
easy to accomplish without any fixed intent or plans. to do~mcire than 
reside in a state for the duration of a, four-year m education, r!and even '" 
then to reside there ooly during the school moo.ths. ~,. This· is ~espectally 
true in the present. age of high mobility Of the young peOJi~e~w~o have 
the means to travel~ · ·· · · -· ··· ,.., .... ·"··· ·'"" .,... , 
II 
If a state had to meet the virtually' impo8sible' compelltiig 
interest test, it. is clear that the me-year residency requirement 
affirmed in Starns v. Malkersan, 401 u. s. 985, ~ as a reasmable elemen: 
in determining bOOa. fide domtclle, would be held invalid. i~· In this case, 
the Connecticut Statute is egregiously irrationa4 as your-opinioo. ,
1
,, ;p; 
demonstrates. .It is therefore unneeess~ .to go beyond the .eonventtooa.J 
, .:r,iili 1\lil:._. "I oJI ~ a __ _ ··- """·' standard.s. t± l[f H "':~ ,...... ,.., ~ 1!11 ~i~,.., hi ill' 
ill! '• ~· ~ :.oil~~ I'll . _ t/.l --, {" il.' ~~~ r;,Jof'll ~ 
In sum, I would be unwilling to·join in"an opinlon<which requires 
a state to show a compelling interest for any restrictions which it .. , .. ~, 
imposes to pr<tect the quality of its own institutions of higher' learntDii 
as well as to protect :UIB own established residents. In any event, it ls''i 
unnecessary to go so far in a ease where traditional equal pr<teetiondi 
standards abundantly suffice to deal with the Coo.nectteut statute. 
.... '~ i~".J' '~ "'.'-···-'·'" 
£ 
•i 




lfp/ss 5/16/73 Rider A, p. 1_~ (Vlandis v. Kline) 
~~. i-o -e~ 
Ce~t>t~ -
fY/, !S /16 ";J. .,Ito J . ~  
Nor should our holding be construed to deny to a state the right 
to include, as one element in demonstrating bona fide domicile 
of a student, a reasonable residency requirement. Starns v. Malkerson, 
!l.!!P~ n. 11. We fulll recogntze that a state has a legitimate interest 
in protecting and preserving the quality of its cblleges and universities 
and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutioo.s 
on a preferential tuition basis. 
We hold only that a permanent and irrebuttable presumption 
of nonresidency, the means adopted by Connecticut to preserve these 
legitimate interests, is for the reasons set forth above violative 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process clause. There 
may be various ways in which a state reasonably may establish 
criteria for assuring that students who are not in fact bona fide 
residents, but who come to the state to attend its educational 
institutions, cannct take advantage of the in-state rates. After 
§126 was invalidated, Connecticut through an official opinion of 
its Attorney General, has adopted one reasonable and generous 
standard for determining the residential status of a student. The 







May 16, 1973 
NO.. 72-493 Vlandis v. Kline 
I deliver herewith a letter which addreSses the suggestion 
by two of our Brothers that your opinion be rewritten to hold that the Tjf!-s 
ccmstitutiooal rlgbt t~. travel ls implicated, and that therefore a stat 
must show a compelllDg ~t.erest as supporting any actiCil tt takes. 
'·'" 11'.: ft. : • ..,ill li ' 'tl<~ ~ 
In reviewmg your ~declslc:m more carefully since our talk, and' -~ 
in discussions with my law clerks, I am now concerned as to possibility 
that 1n its present form the opinion mtgbt be ccmstrued as, restricting 
state actic:m as much as a formulation l:ased on "right to travel". My 
clerks, in particular, think that the opinic:m in its present form coold 
read as requiring no more restrictive standard than a case-by-case 
determlnatlc:m of the domicile or residential status of a new student. 
Apparently this is the thrust of the Connecticut Attorney General's ' 
oplnioo. Yet, as we alllmow, a case-by-case determf.njatton of this 
slippery and largely subjective issue could possibly have a serious 
'effect on a state's capacity to pr~ect a prestigious university against 
large numbers of out-of-state students. n is a relatively simply matter 
,especially in view of the mobility of the young these days, to adopt all 
of the conventlooal badges of domicile and to shed them .. with"equal 
facility. • "' ~ · ·· 
- ,:1! l+" 
. I lm.ow from oU.r · dJscussim,~ and" from your note '11·:tmpliedly 
~f 
approving Starns, that you have no intention of reducing a· state to the 
position where every student can claim to be areesident the day he 
arrives, and have a fair chance of meeting the customary "benchmarks" 
of residency or domicile. ,< .. 
-2-
I wooder, therefore, whether you may not wish to clarify your 
optnlOD tn this respeet. You could put the substance of footnote 11 in 
the text, and make it clear that the Minnes<ta formula represents an 
example of ooe way in which a state reasonably may protect its 
legitimate interest. Other changes also are possible. I enclose a 
roagb draft of a possible rider to be inserted em page 15, if it appeals 
to yoa. 
Sincerely, 





.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
t>' 
i· 
~tt;tTttttt <!fttttri ttf tqt *nitt~ ,jhtttg 
·~ihtsfrittghm. ~. <q:. 2llgt.lJ.,;l 
May 15, 1973 




I, for one, prefer the structuring of your opinion as 
you recirculated it on May 3. An analysis resting on a right 
to travel does not persuade me, and I would not join an opinion 
based on that theory. 
Sincerely, 
~~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 






A · -.~ 
To: Tht{ Chief ,Justice 
Justi.co D::-;tlglas 
J:1:-;t .i co Brennan 
,Tu:;tico Wn.:ito 
Mr. ,J .. L;:ee ~:1.L""h"'.l l 
Mr. Jn:t~.co B1?.ckmun 
Mr . Just~.ce Powell V 
Mr. Justice Her.nquist 
4th DRAFT From: Stewart , J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITE~m;~t~ : 
No. 72-49·3 Recirculated: MAY 18 1973 
Johu W. Vlandis, Director of 
Admissions, the Univer-
sit,v of Connecticut. On Appeal from the ~ 
United States District .,. - -~ 1 
Court for the District ~ 
Appellant, 
'1.'. 
Margaret Marsh Kline and 
Patricia Catapano. 
of Connecticut. •- - -, 
~ 
[May -, 19731 
MR. JusTICE STEWART r:ielivereri the opmiou of the 
Court. 
Like many other States, Connecticut requires non-
residents of the State who are enrolled in the state uni-
versity system to pay tuition and other fees at higher 
rates than residents of the State who are so enrolled. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-329 (b) . as amended by Public 
Act No. 5, ~ 122 (June Session 1971) ' The constitu-
tional validity of that requirement is not at issue in the 
case before us. What 1s at issue here is Connecticut's 
1 Section 122 of that Act provides that "the Board ol TrustC'C'~ ol 
the University of Connecticut o;hall fix fees for tuition of not lC'ss than 
three hundred fifty dollars for residents of this State and not less than 
eight hundred fifty dollars for nonres1dentH . " Pursuant to this 
statute, t he Umversity promulgated regulation~ fixmg the tmt10n prr 
8emestAr m: f ollowH : 
Fall semester Spring semeHter 
1971- 72 1972, and then'after 
In-state studeni Nom~ $175.00 
( 111t-of -state stud em $150.00 $425.00 
Tn add ition , out-of-state ~tudents must pay a $200 nonresident fee 






















2 VLANDIS v. KLINE 
statutory definition of residents and nonresidents for pur-
poses of the above provision. 
Section 126 (a) (2) of Public Act No. 5, amendmg 
~ 10-329 (b), provides that an unmarried student shall 
be classified as a nonresident, or "out-of-state," student 
if his "legal address for any part of the one-year period 
immediately pnor to his application for admission at a 
constituent unit of the state system of higher education 
was outside of Connecticut." With respect to married 
students,§ 126 (a)(3) of the Act provides that such a 
student, if living with his spouse, shall be classified as 
"out-of-state" if his "legal address at the time of his 
application for admission to such a unit was outside of 
Connecticut." These classifications are permanent and 
trrebuttable for the whole time that the student remams 
at the university, since§ 126 (a) (5) of the Act commands 
that: "The status of a student, as established at the time 
of his applicatiOn for admission at a constituent umt of 
the state system of higher education under the provisions 
of this section, shall be his status for the entire period 
of his attendance at such constituent unit." The present 
case concerns the constitutiOnal vahdity of this concJu. 
sive and unchangeable presumption of nonresident status 
from the fact that, at the tune of application for admis-
SIOn, the student, If married, was then living outside of 
Connecticut, or, if single, had lived outside the State at 
some point during the preceding year. 
The appellee, Margaret Marsh Kline, Is au under-
graduate student at the Umversity of Connecticut. In 
May of 1971, while attending college m California. 
she became engaged to Peter Klme, a life-long Con-
nectiCut resident. Because the Klines wished to re-
side m Connecticut after their marnage, Mrs. Khne ap-
plied to the Umversity of Connecticut from Califorma. 
ln late May, she was accepted and informed by the Uni-
versity that she would be considered an uHstate student. 
·- 72-493-0PINION 
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On June 26, 1971 , the appellee and Peter Kline were 
married in California, and soon thereafter took up resi-
dence in Storrs, Connecticut, where they have established 
a permanent home. Mrs. Kline has a Connecticut 
driver's license, her car is registered in Connecticut, and 
she is registered as a Connecticut voter. In July 1971, 
Public Act No. 5 went into effect. Accordingly, the apw 
pellant, Director of Admissions at the University of 
Connecticut, irreversibly classified Mrs. Kline as an out~ 
of-state student, pursuant to § 126 (a) (3) of that Act. 
As a consequence, she was required to pay $150 tuition 
and a $200 nonresident fee for the first semester, whereAs 
a student classified as a Connecticut resident paid no tui-
tion; and upon registration for the second semester, she 
was required to pay $425 tuition plus another $200 non-
resident fee, while a student classified as a Connecticut 
resident paid only $175 tuition. ~ 
The other appellee, Patricia Ca.tapano, is an unmarried 
graduate student at the same University. She applied 
for admission from Ohio in January 1971, and was ac-
cepted in February of that year. In August 1971, she 
moved her residence from Ohio to Connecticut and reg-
istered as a full-time student at the University. Like 
Mrs. Kline, she has a Connecticut driver's license, her 
car is registered in Connecticut, and she is registered as 
a Connecticut voter. Pursuant to § 126 (a)(2) of the 
1971 Act, the appellant classified her permanently as an 
out-of-state student. Consequently, she, too, was re-
quired to pay $150 tuition and a $200 nonresident fee 
for her first semester, and $425 tuition plus a $200 non-
resident fee for her second semester. 
Appellees then brought suit in the District Court pur-
suant to the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, con-
tending that they were bona fide residents of Connecticut, 
2 See n, 1, supra. 
72-493-0PTNIO 
4 VLANDIS v. KLINE 
and that § 126 of Public Act No. 5, under which they 
were classified as nonresidents for purposes of their tui-
tion and fees, infringed their rights to due process of law 
and equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.3 After the 
convening of a three-judge District Court, that Court 
unanimously held~§ 126 (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a.)(5) un-
constitutional, as violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and enjoined the appellant from enforcing those 
sections. 346 F. Supp. 526 (1972). The Court also 
found that before the commencement of the Spnng se-
mester in 1972, each appellee was a bona fide resident of 
Connecticut; and it accordingly ordered that the appel-
lant refund to each of them the amount of tuition and 
fees paid in excess of the amount paid by resident stu-
dents for that semester. On December 4, 1972, we noted 
probable jurisdictwn of this appeal. 409 U. S. 1036. 
The appellees do not cha.llenge, nor did the District 
Court invalidate, the option of the State to classify stu-
dents as resident and nonresident students, thereby ob-
ligating nonresident students to pay higher tuition and 
fees than do bona fide residents. The State's nght to 
make such a classification is unquestioned here. Rather, 
the appellees attack Connecticut's Irreversible and irre-
buttable statutory presumption that because a student's 
legal address was outside the 8tate at the time of his 
applicatwn for admission or at some pomt during the 
preceding year, he remams a uonresident for as loug 
as he IS a student there. This conclusive presump-
twn, they say, IS invalid in that It allows the State 
a While the case was pendmg m the Distnct Court, the Connecticut 
Legislature pasHed a bill relatmg to tuJtJon payments by nonresident;;, 
House Bill No. 5:302, wh1ch would haw repealed the particular por-
twns of the statute that were under constitutional attack. On 
May 18, 1972, however, the Governor of Connecticut vetoed. that 
hill .. 
72-493-0PINION 
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to classify as "out-of-state students" those who are, in 
fact, bona fide ·residents of the State. The appellees 
claim that they have a constitutional right to controvert 
that presumption of nonresidence by presenting evidence 
that they are bona fide residents of Connecticut. The 
District Court agreed: "Assuming that it is permissible 
for the state to impose a heavier burden of tuition and 
fees on non-resident than on resident students, the state 
may not classify as 'out of state students' those who do 
not belong in that class. ' ' 346 F. Supp. , at 528. We 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I 
In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) , the Court 
held that a permanent irrebuttable presumption very 
similar to that before us here violated the Equal Pro-
t.ection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That 
case involved a provision of the Texas Constitution which 
prohibited any member of the armed forces who entered 
the service as a resident of another State and then moved 
his home to Texas during the course of his military duty, 
from ever satisfying the residence requirement for voting 
in Texas elections, so long as he remained a member of 
the armed forces. The effect of that provision was to 
create a conclusive presumption that all servicemen who 
moved to Texas during their military service, even if they 
became bona fide residents of Texas, nonetheless re~ 
mained nonresidents for purposes of voting. The Court 
held that "[b]y forbidding a soldier ever to controvert 
the presumption of nonresidence, the Texas Constitution 
imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." !d. , at 96. Likewise, in Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 349- 352 ( 1972), the Court 
struck down, as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, 
Tennessee's conclusive presumption that recent arrivals 
in the State were not residents and could therefore be 
72-493-0PINION 
() VLANDIS v. KLINE 
barred from the franchise. See also Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U. S. 618 ( 1969) ; Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 
(1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 658 (1972). 
In order to determine the validity, under the Equal 
Protection Clause, of the irrebuttable presumption estab-
lished by Connecticut's statutory scheme, it is necessary, 
at the outset, to pinpoint the precise nature of the clas-
sification created by that presumption. As in Carring-
ton, the challenged classification made by the Connecticut 
statute is not between residents and nonresidents, but be-
tween two types of bona fide residents. In Carrington, 
that classification was between soldiers who were bona 
fide residents of Texas and other bona fide residents of 
the State. In the present case, the relevant classifica-
tion is between bona fide residents of Connecticut who 
applied to the University while living out of State, or 
after having lived outside the State within the preceding 
year, and other bona fide residents of Connecticut.4 Be-
cause of § 126, the former, even though considered Con-
necticut residents for all other purposes, are permanently 
and conclusively presumed to be "out-of-state students' ; 
for purposes of their tuition and fees at the Umversity. 
The basic principles for determining whether such a 
classification violates the Equal Protection Clause were 
set out earlier this Term, in San Anton£o School District 
v. Rodriguez,- U.S.- (1973). There the Court re-
4 For this reason, the argument that Connecticut could exclude all 
nonresidents from its university sy~>tem is irrelevant. The classifica-
tion challenged here is not betweeen res1dents and nonresidents, but 
between two types of bona fide residents, based on the place from 
which they applied for admission. Since Connecticut has chosen 
to admit to Its university system those who apply from out of State, 
the questwn here is whether, if those students thereafter become 
bona fide residents of ConnectJcut, they may be treated differently 
f:r:om othe:r bona fide residents. 
~."! r.:·;;l' 
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peated the familiar principle that the Equal Protection 
Clause forbids a State to make statutory classifications 
that are so wholly arbitrary and capricious as to result in 
invidious discrimination. 
The State proffers three reasons to justify its perma-
nent and conclusive classification of married students who 
applied from outside Connecticut and single students who 
applied within a year of living elsewhere as "out-of-state 
students" for purposes of tuition and fees. The first is 
that the State has a valid interest in equalizing the cost 
of public higher education between Connecticut residents 
and nonresidents, and that by freezing a student's resi-
dential status as of the time he applies, the State ensures 
that its bona fide in-state students will receive their full 
subsidy The State's obJective of cost equalization be-
tween bona fide residents and nonresidents may well be 
legitimate, but basing the bona fides of residency solely 
on where a student lived when he applied for admission 
to the University is a criterion wholly unrelated to that 
obJective. As is evident from the situation of the ap-
pellees here, a student may be a bona fide resident of 
Connecticut even though he applied to the University 
from out of State. Thus, Connecticut's conclusive pre-
sumption of nonresidence, instead of ensuring that only 
its bona fide residents receive their full subsidy, ensures 
that certain of its bona fide residents, such as the ap 
pellees, do not receive their full subsidy, and can never 
do so while they remain students. Connecticut's interest 
in granting its resident students lower rates for tuition 
and fees, therefore, cannot rationally sustain its classi-
fication as nonresident students those who are, in fact, 
residents ' 
6 Connecticul recognizes this princ1plr in its own law. In striking 
down, nnder the Equal Protectton Clause, a conclusive prasumption 
72-49~-0PIN'ION 
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Second, the State argues that even if a student who 
applied to the University from out of State may at some 
point become a bona fide resident of Connecticut, the 
State can nonetheless reawnably decide to favor with the 
lower rates only its established residents, whose past tax 
contributions to the State have been higher. According 
to the State, the fact that established residents or their 
parents have supported the State in the past justifies the 
conclusion that applicants from out of State-who are 
presumed not to be such established residents-may be 
denied the lower rates, even if they have become bona 
fide residents. 
Connecticut's statutory scheme, however, makes no 
distinction on its face between established residents and 
new residents. Rather, through § 122, the State purports 
to distinguish, for tuition purposes, between residents and 
nonresidents by granting the lower rates to the formeT 
and denying them to the latter.6 In these circumstances, 
the State cannot now seek to justify its classification of' 
certain bona fide residents as nonresidents, on the basis 
that their Connecticut residency is "new.'' 
Moreover, § 126 would not always operate even to 
effectuate the State's asserted interest. For it is not at 
all clear that the conclusive presumption required by that 
section prevents only "new" residents, rather than "es-
barring an employer from attemptmg to prove that an employee '~ 
heart ailment was not causally connected to his employment, the Con-
nectiCut Supreme Court stated 
"Constitutionally, the lcgi~lature can no more bind the courts tu 
such a factually insupportable conclusive adjudication that tt can 
require their adjudication that a camel Is a horse by the enactment 
of a statutory conclustve presumptwn that all four-footed animals 
are horses." Duscharme v City of Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 141-43 
285 A. 2d 318, 321 ( 1971) . 
See also V alentme v. Pollak. 95 Conn 556, 561, 111 A. 869. 871 
( 1920). 
" Ser n. 1, ~1~prq. 
, .. ,. 
'> .. • 
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tablished" residents, from obtaining the lower tuition 
rates. For example, a student whose parents were life-
long residents of Connecticut, but who went to college 
at Harvard, established a legal address there, and applied 
to the University of Connecticut's graduate school during 
his senior year, would be permanently classified as an 
"out-of-state student," despite his family's status as 
''established" residents of Connecticut. Similarly, the 
appellee Kline may herself be a "new" resident of Con-
necticut; but her husband is an established, life-long resi-
dent, whose past tax contribution to the State, under the 
State's theory, should entitle his family to the lower rates. 
Conversely, the State makes no attempt to ensure that 
those students to whom it does grant in-state status are 
'
1established" residents of Connecticut. Any married 
person, for instance, who moves to Connecticut before 
applying to the University would be considered a Con-
necticut resident, even if he has lived there only one day. 
Thus, the provisions of § 126 are arbitrary and capricious 
even in terms of the State's own asserted interest in 
favoring established residents over new residents.7 
But even if we accepted the State's argument that its 
statutory scheme operates to apportion tuition rates on 
the basis of old and new residency, that justification itself 
would give rise to grave constitutional problems. For in 
Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, the Court rejected the con~ 
tention that a challenged classification could be sustained 
as an attempt to distinguish between old and new resi-
dents on the basis of the contribution they have made 
7 ThA capriciousnet:~s of Connecticut's scheme is further illustrated 
by the sit uation of a family with two children that moves to Con-
necticut whrle thr, older child rs a semor m hrgh school and the 
younger child IS a junior. [f both attend the University of Con-
nectlcat, the older child pays out-of-state tuition and fees for all 
four yean; of college, while the younger child gets the benefit of the 
J.ower ratP-8 for all fom yAarB, 
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to the community through past payment of taxes. That 
reasoning, the Court stated, "would logically permit the 
State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and lib-
raries or to depnve them of police and fire protection. 
Indeed it would permit the State to apportion all benefits 
and services according to the past tax contributions of its 
citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such 
an apportionment of state services." 394 U. S., at 632-
633. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 96; Dunn v. 
Blumstein, supra, at 354.' 
The third ground advanced to justify § 126 is that 
it provides a degree of administrative certainty. The 
State points to its interest in preventing out-of-state stu-
dents from coming to Connecticut solely to obtain an 
education and then claiming Connecticut residence m 
order to secure the lower tuition and fees. The irrebutta-
ble presumption, the State contends, makes it easier to 
separate out students who come to the State solely for 
Its educational facilities from true Connecticut residents, 
by eliminating the need for an individual determination 
of the bona fides of a person who lived out of State at 
the time of his application. Such an individual deter-
mination, it is said, would not only be an expensive ad-
ministrative burden , but would also be very difficult to 
make, since it is hard to evaluate when bona fide residency 
exists. Without the conclusive presumption, the State 
argues, it would be almost impossible to prevent out-of-
state students from claiming a Connecticut residencE' 
merely to obtam the lower rates 
8 The State also argues that Jt can rea~onabl y favor es tablished 
re::ndents, because their future tax contributiOns to the Stale are 
more rertam. But there IS no reason to suppose that bona fide resi-
dents of Connecticut who have lived there a short time will not sup-
port the State m the futurr to the ~arne extent as thosE' who have 
llved there a long('r time, 
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This same interest in administrative ease and certainty, 
however, was advanced in Carrington v. Rash, supra, and 
the Court rejected it there. 380 U. S., at 95-96. As 
stated in Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at 656, "the Constitu~ 
tion recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency"; 
and that interest, in and of itself, cannot justify the use 
of a conclusive presumption where there are reasonable 
and practicable alternative means of establishing the 
pertinent facts on which the State's objective is premised. 
Here, as in Carrington, reasonable criteria for determining 
bona fide residence are available. Indeed, after § 126 
was invalidated by the District Court, Connecticut 
adopted such criteria for evaluating bona fide residence 
for purposes of tuition and fees at its university system.9 
These criteria, while perhaps more burdensome to apply 
than an irrebuttable presumption, a.re certainly sufficient 
to prevent abuse of the lower, in-state rates by students 
who come to Connecticut solely to obtain an educatiou. 
Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 349-352; Reed v. Reed, 
supra, at 76; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 636.' 0 
In sum, Connecticut has ensured the lower tutiton rates 
to 1ts residents through ~ 122; and yet. through thP 
n See pp 16-17, infra. 
10 The State also claims that thr te~t established by § 126 can be 
f'f\Rily satisfied A married person, it i~ said, can mrrely move to 
Connecticut before applying to the Umvers1ty, or, if he did apply 
from out of State, he ran drop out of college for a semester and then 
reapply. Similar!~·, the State contends, a single person from out of 
State can delay his st ud1es for a ~·ear and establish a Connecticut 
residence for that year before applymg; or If he is already at the 
OmverHtiy, he can merely leave school for a year, reside m Con-
necticut for that yrar, and then reapply. But to reqmre a bona fide 
Connect I cut resident to go through such acrobatics as these m order 
1 o quahfy for the lower, in-state rates , to whiCh all bona fide resi-
drnts arr purportedly entitled, would surely br mvidiously dis-
cnmmatory Cf. Shapiro v, Thompson, 394 11 , S. 618 (1969) , 
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irrebuttable and unchangeable presumption created by 
~ 126, the State has denied those rates to certain bona 
.fide residents. Because that classification is too capri-
cious and arbitrary to effectuate, in any rational way, 
Connecticut's goal of favoring its residents, and because 
the Htate has practicable alternative means of determin-
wg bona fide residence, the State's statutory scheme 
works an invidious discrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protectwn Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Cf. Rinaldi v Yeager, 3M U. ::-; 305 ( l96fi) 
lT 
For somewhat similar reasons, statutes creating per-
manent irrebuttable presumptions have long been dis-
favored under the Due Process Clause as well ln Heiner 
v Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932), the Court was faced 
with a constitutional challenge to a federal statute that 
rreated a conclusive presumpt10n that gifts made withill 
two years prior to the donor's death were made in con -
templation of death, thus reqmring payment by hi& 
estate of a h1gher tax. In holding that this IrrefutablP 
assumptiOn was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to de-
pnve the taxpayer of his property without due process 
of law, the Court stated that It had "held more than 
once that a statute crcatmg a presumptiOn which op-
f'rates to deny a fair opportumty to rebut it violates the 
rlue process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. " /d., 
at 329. See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. t:l . 230 
( 1926) , Hoeper v. Tax Comm~ssion, 284 U S. 206 ( 1931) . 
Mee also Tot v. United States, 319 (I :::; 463. 46R-4fi\-l 
( 1943). 
The more recent case of Bell v. Burson , 402 U. S. 535 
( 1971) , m volved a Georgia statute which provided that 
tf an unmsured motorist was involved in an accident anrl 
could not post security for the amount of damages 
claimed, his drivpr 'f3 license must be suspended without. 
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any hearing on the question of fault or responsibility. 
The Court held that since the State purported to be con~ 
cerned with fault in suspending a driver's license, it 
could not. consistent with procedural due process, con-
clusively presume fault from the fact that the uninsured 
motorist was mvolved in an accident, and could not, 
therefore, suspend his driver's license without a hearing 
on that cruCial factor. 
Likewise, m Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), 
the Court struck down, as violative of the Due Process 
Clause, Illinois' irrebuttable statutory presumption that 
all unmarried fathers are unqualified to raise their chil-
dren. Because of that presumption, the statute required 
the State, upon the death of the mother. to take custody 
of all such illegitimate children, without providing any 
hearing on the father's parental fitness. It may be, the 
Court said, "that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable 
and neglectful parents. . . . But all unmarried father 
are not in this category; some are wholly suited to havf' 
custody of their children." 405 U. S., at 654. Hence , 
the Court held that the State could not conclusively pre-
sume that any mdiv1dual unmarned father was unfit to 
raise his children; rather, Jt was reqUired by the Du 
Process Clause to provide a hearing on that 1ssue. Ac-
cording to the Court, Illinois "insists on presuming rather 
than proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more 
convenient to presume than to prove. Under the Due 
Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to JUstify 
refusing a father a hearing . . " l.d., at 658. 
The same considerat10ns obtam here. It may be that 
most applicants to Connecticut's university system who 
apply from outside the State or within a year of living 
out of State have no real intention of becoming Con-
nectiCut residents and will never do so. But it IS clear 
that not all of the applicants from out of State inevitably 
fa.ll m this category Indeed, m the present case, both 
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appellees possess many of the indicia of Connecticut resi-
dency, such as year-round Connecticut homes, Connecti-
cut driver's licenses, car registrations, voter registrations, 
etc., and both were found by the Distnct Court to have 
become bona fide residents of Connecticut before the 
1972 Spring semester. Yet, under the State's statutory 
scheme, neither was permitted any opportumty to dem-
onstrate the bona fides of her Connecticut residency for 
tuition purposes, and neither w1ll ever have such an 
opportumty m the futurf' so long as she remaiuE> a 
student 
Since Connecticut purports to be concerned with resi-
dency in allocating the rates for tuitiOn and fees at its 
university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process 
Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the 
basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumptiOn of 
nonresidence, when that presumptiOn IS not necessarily 
or universally true in fact, and when the State has rea-
sonable alternative means of making the crucial de-
termination. Rather, standards of due process require 
that the State allow such an individual the oppor-
tunity to present evidence showmg that he IS a bona fidP 
resident entitled to the in-state rates. As 111 Stanley v 
Illinois, supra, the fact that It IS admmistratively more 
efficient, more convement, or more certam for the State 
to rely on the conclusive presumptiOn, rather than to 
make mdiv1dual determmations, cannot save the pre-
sumption from invalidity under the Due Process Clause 
Since S 126 precluded the appellees from ever rebutting 
the presumption that they were nonresidents of Con-
necticut, that statute operated to deprive them of a sig-
nificant amount of their money without due process of 
law. 
lTT 
We recognize, of course, the special problems mvolved 
in determining the bona fide re&idence of college student~ 
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who come from out of State to attend that State's public 
university. Our holding today should in no wise be taken 
to mean that Connecticut must classify the students in 
its university system as residents, for purposes of tuition 
and fees, just because they go to school there. Nor 
should our decision be cot1strucd to deny to a State thE' 
right to impose on a student, as one element in demou-
strating bona fide residence, a reasonable duraticmal res1-
dency requirement, which can be met while in student 
status." We fully recognize that a State bas a legitimat!' 
11 In Starns v. M alkmwn, ;Q(i .F ::lupp :Z;H (Minn. 1970), the 
.Di~trict Court upheld a regulat1011 of t hr l l. niver~ity of 1\iimwoota 
Jlroviding that no ~tudcnt cou ld qualify aHa rc;:;iciC'nt for tuition pm-
[JO~C'K unless hC' had been a bona fid<· domiciliary of the StatC' for at. 
lra~t a yC'ar immC'ciiately pnor tlwreto. Th1;. Court uffirmC'ci sum-
madly. 401 U. S. 9H5 ( 1971 J. MinnC'sota '~ one-year duratlona] 
l'C'sldency requiremC'nt, however, c!JffC'red m an important respect 
from the permanmt irrebuttable' pm:mmptlOIJ at 1 s~ue 111 the presmL 
caoe. UndC'r the regulation involved in .Starns, a Ht udent who applwcl 
to thC' Universit~· from out of Statl' could rebut tlw pre;:;umpt1on of 
honreoidency, after havin!!; liv<>ci 111 tlw Stat<> for Oil(' .war, by pr('~Pnt­
ing sufficient othrr rviciC'nce to ~how bona tick domir1k withm Milllll'-
sota. ln other words, rrsidenrt• within thr Stat<· for om• .\'<'HI , 
wheth<·r or not in studpnt otatu;.., wns merely on<' l'IC'mrnt which :Vlin-
nrHota required to dl'mon~t ratr bona fide JomiClil' . B~ · contra::;t, t hl' 
C'onnrrticut statutr prevents a student who applied to the Univrrsity 
from out of Statr, or within a .\'('~ll' of livmg out of State, from ('vrr 
rl'buttmg the presumption of nonrrs1dence during thP rntin· tim<' 
that lw remain~ a st udent , no mat tPr how loug hr haH bern a bolla 
fidr rrHident of t hr State for ot h<·r purpose:;. U ndrr l\finne;:;ot a ·~ 
durational residency rrquirPmt•nt, a ~tudcnt could qualify for in-stal!' 
rates by living within the State for a year in student status; whereas 
nnder Connecticut's scheme, a person who applied from out of StatP-
can never so qualify oo long as he remam~ m student status. The 
District Court in Starns recogmzed this distmctwn. "Thus, there is 
here no arbitrary or permanent classificatiOn of the type found to 
constitute invidious discnmmation m Carnngton v. Rash ... " 
32() .F. Supp., at 240. Ser aiHo Ktrk \'. Board of Regents of Univ. 
of California, 27:3 Cal. App. 2d 4:30 . 7k Cal Hptr . 260 (1969), apJwal 
rli;;mi;;sed , :396 (1, S. 554 (1970'1, 
,0, 
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interest in protecting and preserving the quality- pf its 
colleges and universities and the right of its own bona 
fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential 
tuition basis. 
We hold only that a permanent irrebuttable presump-
tion of nonresidence-the means adopted by Connecticut 
to preserve that legitimate interest~is .. for the reason sPt 
forth abovE;',. viQlativ(:': of th<" Fourt~~nth Amendmeu t . 
The State cap establish such reasonable criteria for in ~ 
state status as to make virtually certain that students 
wha are, not in fact bona fide residents of the 8tate, but 
• - ,... ,I • 
w~o have come there solely for educational purposes. 
cannot take advantage of the in-state rates. lndee<i .. 
as stated above, such criteria exist; and since ~ 126 was 
invalidated. Connecticut. through an official opinion uf 
jts Attorney General. has adopted one such reasonablP 
Rtandard for determining the residential status of a 
f\tudent. The Attorney General's opinion states · 
"In reviewing a claim of in-state status, the issue 
becomes essentially one of domicile. In general, the 
domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and perma-
nent home and place of habitation. ft is the place 
to which. whenever he is absent, he has the inten ~ 
tion of returning. This general statement, how-
ever, is difficult of application. Each individual case 
must be decided on its own particular facts. ln re-
viewing a claim, relevant criteria include year-round 
residence, voter registratiOn, place of filing tax re-
turns, property ownership, driver's license, car regis-
tration, marital status, vacation employment, etc." 12 
Because we hold that the permanent Irrebuttable pre-
sumption of nonresidence created by subsections (a) (2), 
12 Opmwn of the Attorney General of the State of Connecticut 
Regardin~ Non-Res1dent Tuition, September fi, 1972 (unreported) . 
" 
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(a)(3), and (a)(5) of Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-329 (b) , 
as amended by Public Act No. 5, § 126 ( 1971), violates 
the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
